In his article “Atomic Energy and the Democratic Process” Robert Dahl examines the way in which democracy governs atomic production. Dahl notes that in a democracy really only a portion of the public actually participates in an issue, though any individual can be mobilized into the active group if compelled by an issue. The author notes that when addressing atomic energy the group allowed to participate is constricted by the requirement of secrecy (regarding details of weapon production and emergency plans). Dahl points out that citizens “in the absence of secrecy, perhaps could and would be activated as attentive citizens” (p. 2). The author then steps further to indicate that to maintain this secrecy only a handful of “elites” are allowed to rule. The fact such important decisions lie in the hands of a few is alarming. Secrecy contradicts the idea of democracy in itself. Considering the actions of leaders in the Cold War and the sentiments of the public, one must question whether nuclear proliferation by both the US and the USSR were moves that benefited public interest or a handful of individuals acting on their own behalf.

The idea of elitist control permeates Dr. Strangelove's message. In the film a deranged general sends US planes towards Russia to be intercepted, essentially precipitating WWIII. The general’s relatively unchecked control signifies the power leaders commanded and could manipulate regardless of public interest. One must question whether given the concerns of nuclear accumulation society as a whole would have pursued the path of nuclear development. Considering the apocalyptic ending of Dr. Strangelove it would seem Kubrick thinks not.

America’s insistence on involving itself in the control of foreign nations, an issue recurrent in many of the articles regarding Dr. Strangelove and more broadly the Cold War, is again addressed in the article “Central America as a Theater of U.S. Cold War Politics.” Here author Susanne Jonas observes the late 1980s political movements in Central America that mirror actions of the Cold War era. Jonas also notes tendencies of US government to “control its allies (particularly in Europe)” (p. 125). As mentioned in the article by Robert Frase, Jonas points out that elitists run political programs, especially international agendas, and in the case of Central America the majority’s interests were not considered when drafting policy. For example when considering wealth reallocations Jonas points out that “[i]n short, the new strategy was based on the assumption that the Central American working class (both rural and urban) would be kept at bare subsistence level” (p. 124).

The article by Jonas also recognizes the effects of Vietnam on the Cold War attitude of the US. After essential losing in Vietnam, America “no longer dominat[ed] the capitalist world like it once did and [was] no longer able to impose its will by unilateral action” (p. 126). The circumstances of Vietnam help put in perspectives the policies adopted by the US government regarding arms. Confronted with failure, the US may have found it necessary to outpace the USSR to reaffirm its position as an international superpower. Such competition would drive the arms race and create tensions between the countries.

America’s actions in Central America resemble the type that Dr. Strangelove satirizes. Again, the US appears like the over-zealous fighter ready to get a hand into other countries operations. Although the Central American countries don’t have the resources that were available to Russia, the underlying circumstances of the situation resemble those that started the arms race and Cold War between the US and the USSR.

Charles Maland’s article “Dr. Strangelove (1964): Nightmare Comedy and the Ideology of the Liberal Consensus” reviews the way in which Stanley Kubrick’s film responds to dominant culture’s social norms of the 1930s and later war years. The article notes the way which Dr. Strangelove, and other Kubrick films, addressed the “gap between man’s scientific and technological skill and his social, political, and moral ineptitude” (p. 701). Kubrick’s message in the film comes across strong; man’s technological progression has outpaced his morality and wisdom. Skill and good judgment should balance each other, but because of their disproportion scientific progression is able to do more harm than good.

Considering the social conditions leading up to the production of Dr. Strangelove one can understand the formation of Kubrick’s perspectives. The 1930s saw social concentration shift from the economy to foreign governments. The war years directed attention towards defeating opposing powers. Success in war and economic prosperity created a paradigm that required the US lead other countries (p. 698). Russians, under new leadership and not wanting to appear the weaker nation after a difficult war, pursued a similar course of action. The resulting international tension established an atmosphere ripe for a film like Dr. Strangelove. Anxiety ran high and the most paradoxical elements of public policy seemed to lie at the heart of the guidelines. Dr. Strangelove masterfully captures the realities of its period but in a mode so embellished one can discern the message propagated by the film.

Robert Frase’s article “International Control of Nuclear Weapons” immediately addresses the notion that control of nuclear power “is as much a psychological and political problem as a technical one” (p. 16).  In the article Frase recognizes four issues that prevented the United Nations and the Soviet Union from establishing an atomic energy resolution, a deal which would have allowed the international observation of nuclear programs and possibly have prevented an arms race.  The four issues Frase identifies are 1) a fear of contact with the west, 2) Soviet attitude of inferiority in joint enterprise, 3) lack of immediate economic benefits included in a Soviet atomic energy plan, and 4) hedges placed around offers of an international joint effort (p. 17).  Recurrent behind these points is the issue of American insistence upon cooperation in joint projects.  Soviet concern that non-military information would be given up then lead to adamant rejection of energy proposals.  It seems, as mentioned in the Maland piece, that determination on both sides to establish themself as the superior power lead to the irreversible accumulation of weapons.  It is interesting to consider that the Frase article, written in 1953, essentially identifies reasons for and predicts a tense continuation of the arms race yet could not create a change to prevent it.

In Dr. Strangelove the obstinate doggedness of each leader and the illogical agreement between countries epitomizes the actual indifferences the US and the Soviet Union couldn’t overcome.  Also, unlike the rather ineffective message of the Frase article, Kubrick’s satirical approach to the confrontations between countries opened the doors to a great deal of political criticism.       

Reelpolitik II studies how political perspectives influenced and were influenced by film and media in the 1950s and 60s. Specifically, chapter 9 of the book, “Cold War Dovism in Dr. Strangelove”, closely examines social perception of nuclear war and the effect opinions had on the acceptance of the film’s message. In the book, author Beverly Kelley argues that “dovism”, pacifist, anti-war attitude, overwhelmed militarism because of the public’s apprehension of the consequences of international conflict.

The chapter starts by detailing important Cold War events that escalated international alarm, and shows the impact such incidents had on the public. The book then focuses on the presidents that guided the country through the perilous times, noting how both President Eisenhower and President Kennedy (it notes President Johnson only briefly) avoided nuclear warfare using polar approaches. Finally, the chapter turns its attention to Dr. Strangelove, or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb. This section addresses first the representation of characters in the film, and then the consequences of the message on the public. Dr. Strangelove satirically highlights the absurdity of nuclear armament, and, though humorously, addresses frightening issues.

In its review of mid-1900 political ideology, Reelpolitik II illuminates the issues that underlie the message of Dr. Strangelove. The film wittily captures the irrationality behind the use of weapons as protection. Reelpolitik II summarizes the political atmosphere that the film satirizes and indicates how socieity's attitude was influenced by the film's message and how the film's message was shaped by society's posture.