Bill Adkinson who wrote this blog, basically takes the stance that he doesn't like what the NFL did, but he understands why. The Super Bowl is not a pay per view broadcast, and it is free for the public because it is being paid for by advertisers. However, without advertisers, there is no broadcast, and what attracts advertisers is large numbers of their key demographics tuning in to the show they are advertising for. When fewer people are watching a show (whether because there truly are fewer people watching or the ratings are inaccurate) advertisers aren't willing to pay as much. Adkinson's comment is "Oh of course. Show me the money!"

 Adkinson quickly changes his tone though as he acknowledges the economics behind the NFL's logic. They are limited by the fact that they are dependent on advertisers to keep their games on the air waves. The multi-million dollar contracts signed every year by players have to be financed by something; the majority of which comes from advertising dollars. Thus there is a great deal of pressure on the NFL to get "eyeballs on the screen" as Adkinson says. The measurement of these "eyeballs" comes in the form of Nielsen ratings generated by boxes in people's homes that track what programs are being watched. How these ratings are measured are not determined by the NFL, they are at the mercy of the system.

 What is the solution? Adkinson's recommendation is that content providers provide the opportunity to enjoy excellent content in a convenient format so that they get what they pay for. If the content providers would assured of getting what they pay for, this would be a reasonable solution. With the average Super Bowl party hosting 17 people in 2001(http://advertising.about.com/od/superbowlcoverage/a/xxxvfunfacts.htm) it is apparent that Nielsen ratings are not the ideal measure of viewership. If consumers good enjoy a good football game in a sports bar drinking beer with their buddies watching on a big screen AND the Nielsen ratings reflected that 3000 people were watching, everyone would get what they pay for.

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This article recounts the early days after the decision was announced to break Viacom into two separate companies (one cable, which would be a growth stock, and the other broadcasting, which would be a value stock). Simply put, Sumner Redstone’s acquisition strategy was not nearly as successful as he had expected it to be. Indeed, it has failed. But, that does not mean that the split is welcomed with open arms and rave reviews on the part of Wall Street analysts.
The main logic behind the split up is that sprawling conglomerates become dragged down by their own size and that expected synergies often do not occur because of management struggles or clashes of corporate cultures (see chapter 11, pages 233-235 of Media Economics, Theory and Practice for a great example of this).