15 Yale J.L. & Human. 1 (2003)

     This article delves into the origins of the work for hire doctrine.  In order to properly understand the Mauro v Allentown case it is important to understand the basis for the plaintiff's principle argument.  The article does not specifically address the relation of the teacher exception to the general work for hire principle, however it does evaluate several aspects of the work for hire doctrine and how they apply to various media.

     For the purposes of this project I focused mostly on the law authorship subsections.  I did this because that section had the most relation to academic copyright.  This section looks first at the case of Wheaton v Peters from 1834.  The case affirms the ability of a reporter to hold a copyright on the proceedings and decision of a court case.  This situation bears similarities to a professor copyrighting his lecture notes or similar works, which was later affirmed in Williams v Weisser (also tagged).  The similarity exists because in each case the base of work is generally available; either as ideas and facts in the case of lecture notes or government documents in the case of court proceedings.  What makes them copyrightable is the fact that they contain a ‘web of expression.’  Court reporters were not able to copyright the actual opinions of the judge but everything else they recorded could be, including the way they ordered the arguments.  In the same way professors cannot copyright the individual facts used, but they can copyright the order and style used to present them.

     This freedom began to change in the late 1800s.  Up until this point it was generally understood that employees could hold their own copyrights and use them as they saw fit.  Around this point though several cases were decided that began to erode that right.  In each case there was little immediate harm done, since there were always mitigating circumstances which weakened the impact of awarding employers copyright instead of employees.  After these clauses were inserted there was little use for them.  The courts continued as they had been: awarding copyright to authors on other circumstances, but always including the clause stating that the employers could control the copyright.  The change in philosphy came subtly when courts began to see the contract between employer and employee implicitly granting the copyright to the employer instead of vice-versa.  This decision was based on previous court decisions that had never actually given the copyright to the employers, but instead always found a loophole to give the rights to the employee.  Once the philosphical chage occured it became necessary for an employee to have a contract to keep their rights, instead of a contract to give the rights to the employer.  This was enshrined into copyright law in the 1909 copyright act and further defined in the 1976 act.