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Fair use is a term that originated in the United States.  It allows limited use of material that is copyrighted.  With fair use, permission is not required depending with appropriate circumstances. Fair use is defined and regulated with a four-factor test.  Using this test, one can tell if it violates copyright. A work must satisfy all four factors to pass the test.  Fair use is a tricky subject because it really does vary in every case.

The first factor says that a work is fair use depending on “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”

The second factor concerns, “ The nature of the copyrighted work.”

“The amount and substantiality of the potion used in relation,” is the third critical factor

The final factor says that a work is fair use depending on “ The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” 

IT would be ridiculous if you had to ask for permission everytime you were going to use a copyrighted work.  This is the purpose of fair use.  Fair use was created in tune with the goal of copyright: "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."

This information lays the foundation for my paper.  It provides the background information for me.  My claim is that the DMCA violates fair use and copyright.  By outlining the purpose of copyright and the factors of fair use, I can then tell how DMCA violates.

belongs to DMCA annotated bibliography project
tagged copyright dmca fair_use by makeda ...on 01-DEC-08

This is a public policy report that offers important research for my paper.  It discusses how “free” expression really is in this new age with strict copyright control like the DMCA.  The Brennan Center for Justice conducted a research project in 2004.  The objective of the project was to see how the people, artists and scholars, directly affected by fair use were dealing with it.  These are the people who make significant contributions to culture and will definitely be affected by an amendment like the DMCA.  The Brennan Center used interviews, online surveys, focus group discourse, and most importantly, an analysis of about 153 of 300 take down letters.  The most interesting to me and the method that I plan to discuss in my paper is the analysis of the take down notices.  The 153 notices were aimed at materials that were actually fair use or had a weak IP claims.  

 

The research showed a strong positive correlation between the strength of fair use claim and the likelihood that the material would be removed.  There was also a troubling finding that even when there were weak IP claims, more than half of trademarked words or phrases were removed.  Even though it was fair use, the weak IP claims won.  Overall, the take down notices really are distinctly violating the first amendment. 

 

The other methods, interviews, online surveys, and focus group discussion found two common, major themes.  The research project found that there is a great deal of confusion about fair use and the DMCA.  Also, there is an enormous need for a legal support base to deal with gatekeepers.  The paper suggests possible improvements: a clearinghouse for information like how to reply to take down notices, legal support base, and decreases to the penalties.

 

I plan to use this paper’s research to support my claims 

1. People have inadequate knowledge about DMCA, fair use, and their first amendment rights

2. Gatekeepers are abusing take down notice rights

3. How effective are the take down notices at eliminating copyright infringement? 

4. Who are the innocent bystanders being caught up by the take down notices?

In this post from “The Blog Herald,” Jonathan Bailey proclaims that the X17, Inc. vs. Perez Hilton case has the “potential to drastically impact bloggers and small webmasters."  Bailey cites the copyright cases against Hilton, including the Universal Studios suit involving a topless photograph of Jennifer Aniston.  In discussing the X17 case, he purports that the blogger and the photograph agency were at a stalemate, as Hilton’s motion to dismiss the suit was denied, but he was allowed to “keep his site online while the lawsuit was pending.”  However, Hilton’s site temporarily went down when Crucial Paradigm, his Australian web host, blocked Hilton’s access “due to the volume of copyright complaints,” and subsequently, he moved his site to the Voxel Dot Net server.  The blog post discusses a separate lawsuit filed by Hilton against the photograph agency, an obvious vindictive move, “citing what [Hilton] called unfair competition.”  Hilton argues that X17 “does not pay its photographers properly” and “hires illegal immigrants” to maintain low costs.  In discussing “what was at stake,” Bailey asserts that the decision could establish guidelines for using others photographs on the Internet, especially in regard to published versus unpublished works.  He believes that if the ruling is broad enough, the decision could “impact the Youtube crowd, many of whom take copyrighted works and make humorous modifications to the video, and it could impact link blogging services that republish articles, such as Google Reader’s “Share” feature.” 
    For the purposes of my paper, this blog post introduces information not contained in the legal documents filed in court.  The fact that Hilton’s server terminated his service is representative of the highly contentious nature of the X17 lawsuit.  Although the case only involves one individual, Hilton seems to be at the forefront of the blog world; therefore, the outcome of this case may have broad implications for the whole cyber world.  The decision of the lawsuit may elucidate what constitutes a parody in regard to photographs.  Small alterations to the photographs, in the form of doodles, may be deemed a satire, rather than a parody, by a court of law, thereby making it harder for Hilton to claim fair use.  Additionally, the “unfair competition” lawsuit referenced in the blog post may reveal Hilton’s desire to retaliate against X17.  He obviously lacks standing in a lawsuit filed that alleges that X17 exploits its photographers, some with “criminal backgrounds and gang affiliations.”  The lawsuit is clearly a public attack aimed at damaging X17’s reputation.  Finally, this blog is the first source to reference Hilton’s procedure for a takedown request.  The existence of this procedure on his website seems backwards, as Hilton is attempting to secure DMCA protection for himself.  However, Section 512 of American copyright law grants protection from monetary damages if “the transmission of the material was initiated by or at the direction of a person other than the service provider.”  In this case, however, Hilton himself is posting the copyrighted pictures on his website, not an third-party user, so he affords himself no DMCA protection.

    This source linked is only McCain - Palin’s initial correspondence to YouTube.  YouTube’s response can be viewed here:
    This letter by the McCain campaign expresses former presidential candidate’s displeasure with YouTube over questionable infringement claims made by the national news media.  After the campaign created advertisements using well known video clips from national media sources and uploaded them to YouTube, news organizations like CBS sent YouTube DMCA takedown notices for hosting videos that they believed infringed on their copyright.  Central to their claim was the fact that they did not want their videos and personalities to be seen as endorsing one candidate or another.  YouTube promptly removed the videos, which drew the ire of the McCain campaign.  Even though YouTube was properly following DMCA protocol, McCain lamented that the process would take too long to be resolved (between 10 and 14 days), and asserted that YouTube should make a fair use judgment itself before removing the video.  McCain asked for special treatment, allowing for videos uploading by the official candidates’ campaigns to be looked at differently when receiving takedown notices.  In YouTube’s response, the video host declined these requests claiming that it was simply following the procedure laid out in the DMCA to protect its safe harbor status, and that they could not discriminate between uploaders.  A McCain representative asserted that the DMCA does not necessarily define with what specific speed a host must comply with a takedown notice, and responding automatically is not mandated.
    This situation provides one of the central examples I will use in my paper.  McCain’s difficulties with the intricacies of the DMCA provide a high profile example of how certain provisions can be abused.  It is particularly valuable because even though the correspondence is between the McCain campaign and YouTube, both organizations are effectively complaining about the takedown and notice process, albeit to different degrees.  Even as YouTube says it is simply following protocol, it criticizes those who abuse the takedown process.  Meanwhile, the McCain campaign reiterates the problems many see in the lack of timely recourse alleged infringers have in the process.

    In this article, Paul Alan Levy echoes the calls by some to combat abuse of the DMCA notice and takedown system by shaming those who make illegitimate claims and the others who needlessly comply, as well as take possible legal action against them.  Levy also argues that the better approach would be to reform the DMCA itself, especially since both the McCain and Obama had problems with the system, and both would be a position to change the law regardless of the election outcome.  He proposes 5 specific changes in the DMCA.  The first would be to allow ISPs and service providers to not effectively be required to immediately takedown allegedly infringing material, while still maintaining safe harbor status.  Secondly, he proposes making it easier for people who receive bogus takedown claims to receive compensation via statutory damages, presumably deterring copyright holders from filing false claims.  He also suggests notification by the service provider to the possible infringer before the content is removed, as well as requiring takedown notices to be submitted to a public database for viewing.  Finally, Levy argues for all intellectual property types to be protected, not just copyright.  His agenda is put forth at a time when both potential presidents, having felt the negative effects of the DMCA, may be more motivated to remedy it.
    This article is extremely beneficial in that it outlines a significant number of ways to amend the DMCA and resolve the current notice and takedown problem.  His position is not explicitly based in anger, aggravation, or retribution, and offers a clear list of ways to fix a broken system.  I will primarily use this article to offer constructive remedies to the problem I plan to expose.  Particularly, his suggestion to allow the service provider to notify the alleged infringer prior to the content being removed, while simultaneously not surrendering its safe harbor status, is a proposal not without flaws, but could possibly be an important part of the recommendations I make to fix the system.

    This policy paper from the Brennan Center for Justice sought to determine how strong the fair use doctrine remains in the digital age.  For the section analyzing the role notice and takedown plays, the catalog of 2004 letters received by Chilling Effects Clearinghouse was used as the data set.  To determine issues concerning fair use and the First Amendment, a subset of 153 letters was used.  The authors mentioned that it is more likely than not that this data sample under represented possible speech-suppressing efforts because only those people knowledgeable enough to submit their letters to Chilling Effects were included.  With this in mind, the complaints were split into strong, reasonable, possible, and weak fair use claims.  The results were described as “troubling,” with the combination of the accusers who had only a weak claim to copyright and the alleged infringers who had a strong claim to fair use amounting to 20% of all claims.  Another 27% of claims fit into the category where there were possible fair use defenses.  In total, the author puts forth that almost one in two takedown notices had the potential of improperly hindering free expression.  The study is important because it concludes that censorship power is put “in the hand of the IP owners.”
    Although a likely assumption, this study demonstrates the correlation between strength of the fair use defense and removal of allegedly infringing material.  Naturally, the more substantive the fair use/First Amendment claim, the more likely the alleged infringing content would remain online.  I will possibly use this in support of the idea that the notice and takedown system is not as reckless and arbitrary as some would claim.  However, I will also be sure to point out that even in cases of strong fair use, there was a significant occurrence of free-speech suppression, with over 40% of material either partially or entirely removed.

    This order from the US District Court for Northern California rejects Universal Music Group’s request to dismiss the lawsuit against the music company by Stephanie Lenz.  Months after posting a clip of her son dancing to a Prince song to YouTube, Universal asked the video host to remove the clip, claiming she was infringing their copyright of the song “Let’s Go Crazy.”  Following the procedure under the DMCA, Lenz told YouTube that her video was legal, and it was restored – Universal did not pursue legal action against Lenz since her use was clearly fair.  However, in conjunction with the EFF, Lenz sued Universal for acting in bad faith, and asked for compensation covering her legal costs.  She alleged that Universal specifically did not “belie[ve] that [Lenz] actually infringed a copyright,” and that its takedown request was entirely improper.  This order covers the most recent development, with Judge Jeremy Fogel refusing to dismiss the lawsuit as Universal wanted, and declaring that copyright holders must take fair use into account before issuing DMCA takedown notices.  Universal had argued that it was not incumbent on copyright holders to consider a potential fair use defense, and that doing so would be costly and disruptive.  The Judge rejected this argument, and while admitting that he did not believe it to be likely that Lenz could eventually win the lawsuit against Universal, still allowed it to progress nonetheless.
    Fogel’s decision is going to play a big role in my paper, as this order sets precedent for other courts to look fair use at when determining takedown-abuse cases.  The decision is unique in that it helps define what a copyright holder must do to clear the “materially misrepresents” hurdle set in Section 512, adding consideration of fair use.  Previously, it could have been possible for copyright holders to more recklessly send takedown notices to service providers, and make a credible claim that they were not active in misrepresenting since a limited (and undefined) amount of care was given to the process.  With the addition of fair use, the burden is higher, which I will argue is beneficial to the takedown process.  Despite the judge’s assurances that adding a fair use component will not add a tremendous amount of complexity to the process, it will also be worth mentioning how many people disagree with this claim, believing that the four factor test for determining fair use is inherently nebulous and difficult to use.

United States Copyright Office.  The Digital Millenium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. Copyright Office Summary.  United States Copyright Office.  28 November 2006. .

This is a summary of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, created by the Copyright Office. It renders the more technical language and organization of the law itself into a much more straightforward form. It definitely says something about the polarizing nature of the DMCA that the only article which I have come across without a very strong, clear viewpoint of the subject is a pure summary; as could be expected, the Copyright Office is attempting to maintain an objective viewpoint, to whatever degree possible.

The DMCA was created as a way in which copyright law could be adapted to the questions raised by digital technologies. The most controversial section of the DMCA added a Chapter 12 to Title 17 of the United States Code; this section contains the much-talked-about "anticircumvention provisions", criminalizing any attempt to break through digital copy protection (CSS encryption on DVDs, etc.). Another section of law removes any liability for online copyright violations from online service providers as long as they adhere to certain broad guidelines. There is also the possibility of application for exemptions from the DMCA for non-infringing uses which require circumvention of encryption.

My project requires a detailed knowledge of the provisions of the DMCA itself; I not only plan to quote directly from the DMCA in my project, but also to use clips appropriated from DVDs to create the project. This summary of the law is one of the most simple and concise descriptions of its provisions, without much color in the form of personal opinions.

 

belongs to DMCA project
tagged anticircumvention copyright dmca drm fair_use by makeda ...and 10 other people ...on 18-NOV-08

United States Copyright Office.  The Digital Millenium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. Copyright Office Summary.  United States Copyright Office.  28 November 2006. .

This is a summary of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, created by the Copyright Office. It renders the more technical language and organization of the law itself into a much more straightforward form. It definitely says something about the polarizing nature of the DMCA that the only article which I have come across without a very strong, clear viewpoint of the subject is a pure summary; as could be expected, the Copyright Office is attempting to maintain an objective viewpoint, to whatever degree possible.

The DMCA was created as a way in which copyright law could be adapted to the questions raised by digital technologies. The most controversial section of the DMCA added a Chapter 12 to Title 17 of the United States Code; this section contains the much-talked-about "anticircumvention provisions", criminalizing any attempt to break through digital copy protection (CSS encryption on DVDs, etc.). Another section of law removes any liability for online copyright violations from online service providers as long as they adhere to certain broad guidelines. There is also the possibility of application for exemptions from the DMCA for non-infringing uses which require circumvention of encryption.

My project requires a detailed knowledge of the provisions of the DMCA itself; I not only plan to quote directly from the DMCA in my project, but also to use clips appropriated from DVDs to create the project. This summary of the law is one of the most simple and concise descriptions of its provisions, without much color in the form of personal opinions.

 

belongs to Test project
tagged anticircumvention copyright dmca drm fair_use by michare ...and 10 other people ...on 12-NOV-08

Author Fred von Lohmann discusses the role of the 'gatekepers' (such as exhibitors, insurers, distributors, and broadcasters) when filmmakers may have to clear copyright uses in their own works. While fair use is supposed to protect the transformative uses of copyrighted materials, many gatekeepers and large broadcasters and studios are failing to honor the principles of fair use. Instead, we are seeing more of what von Lohmann calls a 'clearance culture' in which full expression is stifled at the hands of media gatekeepers. The content controllers are requiring clearances for every instance of copyrighted material in films, even if it falls under fair use. This is causing many films either to be abondoned during production or distribution or for filmmakers budgets to be severely drained by obtaining clearances. In terms of relevance to my own project, the role of the gatekeepers helps to explain why the full potential of online film distribution has not yet been explored. Although this article focuses mostly on fair use and copyright clearance, when I read this article it made perfect sense why some directors (such as the more established Edward Burns or the newcomer Madonna) reject the traditional distribution system for many different reasons, and choose to distribute through online platforms such as iTunes.

The rise of internet distribution offers new outlets for filmmakers who can not afford the traditional methods of distribution. von Lohmann identifies two distribution options: video hosting sites such as YouTube or Yahoo Video that can get your film to an audience for free and immediately, as well as by purchasing bandwidth from an ISP and running your film online via a filmmakers' own server.

Internet gatekeepers such as a YouTube or an ISP are more lax than traditional ones due to the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA. In the case of online video content sites, they use a 'notice and takedown' policy to enforce copyright infringement violations. In order for a video hosting site to be free from monetary damages incurred through a copyright infringing video posted by a site user, the host must issue notice to the user that the content requires them to takedown their video, followed by a 'counternotice' option for the user's benefit in the event that a user wants to challenge the takedown. So long as the site removes the copyrighted content in a timely manner and follows this procedure, they will remain exempt from prosecution.

If a filmmaker decides to host his own video by buying a service from an ISP, a similar safe harbor under the DMCA protects the ISP's from any possibly copyright lawsuit. Under this provision, ISP's are not required to follow the 'notice and takedown, counternotice' steps as outlined above. They are viewed as only the 'pipe' in providing access, not an entity that can enforce the content present on computers owned by others and therefore out of its control. As in video content sites, ISP's do not act as middlemen in any copyright lawsuits, therefore leaving the filmmakers or other users to work out their own disputes with copyright owners directly. 

von Lohmann argues that these new distribution tools represent a new creative freedom or at least, should ensure new creative freedoms in the future. Under these new options, filmmakers' work can reach the proper audiences first - unlike in traditional media distribution in which work must pass through insurers and lawyers first.
. Digital dilemma : intellectual property in the information age / Committee on Intellectual Property Rights and the Emerging Information Infrastructure, Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applic 0309064996 (pbk.) series Washington, D.C. : National Academy Press, c2000.
Call#: Van Pelt Library KF2979 .D54 2000
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tagged book cine_500 dmca drm fair_use by djaime ...on 07-APR-08

Newman, Jon O. EFF: Appellate Decision in Universal v. Reimerdes. Electronic Frontier Foundation. 22 November 2006. <http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/MPAA_DVD_cases/?f=20011128_ny_appeal_decision.html>.

This famous court case involved the publication of the "DeCSS" decryption program on the website 2600.com.  "DeCSS" was designed to break through the CSS encryption on DVDs.  The action of posting this program challenged the Digital Millenium Copyright Act which bans any measure of breaking through digital encryption, or any publication or distribution of any such measure. Eight film studios, including Universal, brought a suit against the operators of 2600.com, seeking to have "DeCSS" and any links to other sites containing it removed from 2600.com for violations of the DMCA.

The appeal challenged the constitutionality of the DMCA, claiming that it restricts free speech, and called for a narrow construction of its terms.  They also claimed that "is rooted in and required by both the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment," and that the DMCA restricts this.  However, the appeals court found no reasoning for these claims, and upheld an earlier injunction by a lower court requiring the removal of the "DeCSS" program and any links to it.

This case is extremely important because it establishes that arguments regarding fair use and free speech are almost no match for the terms of the DMCA.  Were it not for the DMCA, I think it would definitely be easy to argue for my video project as a fair use; however, cases like this clearly state that this is no defense.  The court states that there is no constitutional requirement for a fair use standard, and that such claims cannot supersede violations of anticircumvention laws.

            This case was brought to raise questions about the legality and constitutionality of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. The argument is that "the DMCA's anti-device provisions are not a valid exercise of any of Congress' enumerated powers," and that they also "violate limits on the scope of copyright protection required by the First Amendment." The first part says that the Intellectual Property Clause does not give the authorization that anti-device provisions give, which allow technology to be banned regardless of how the device is actually used. The second argument is that in the anti-device provisions, Congress overstepped the authority given by both the Intellectual Property Clause, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, and upset the balance created by the Intellectual Property Clause, resulting in the monopolies that the framer sought to avoid. The third argument is that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to override other constitutional constraints. The fourth argument is that anti-device provisions violate First Amendment Limits on the scale of copyright protection.

 

            I am researching why copyright holders in the case specifically of major record labels are willing to waive their copyright in certain situations such as MP3 blogs while choosing to exercise the copyright in similar situations such as peer-to-peer file-sharing networks. The case is relevant although it is not about blogs in that it provides an argument against a proposed end goal for copyright holders, the DMCA's anti-device provisions. The argument is that it upsets the balance intended between copyright and censorship and monopolies. Anti-device provisions would ban many devices even with commercially significant uses and would contradict fair use and First Amendment arguments, and would effectively end any possibility for use of technology such as MP3 blogs.

            This essay describes what an MP3 blog is, and how record labels want to capitalize on the promotion that they provide while fighting file sharing at the same time. The essay discusses the types of copyright infringement and fair use and how they apply to MP3 blogs, as well as the factors that cause the court to view MP3 blogs more favorably than peer-to-peer networks. It discusses law suits against Napster and also by the RIAA against peer-to-peer users.  The article explains what establishes liability for infringing use, and the different expansions of the Copyright Act which have been brought by copyright owners in addressing new technologies. It then discusses some of these acts and gives some examples of violators. The next section explains the defense used when copyright owners bring suits, which is fair use, and it lists and describes the four factors in deciding fair use on a case by case basis.

 

            This essay incorporates basically every aspect of my research into why copyright holders are willing to waive certain copyright in cases such as MP3 blogs, while they continue to fight against much of new technology such as peer-to-peer services. It describes what MP3 blogs are and how they are used and different sites that can link to the unauthorized music.  It shows what the copyright holder needs to look for in order to bring a suit against infringing users, and also explains how the user of the work can try to use fair use as a defense.

Electronic Frontier Foundation. EFF: Unintended Consequences: Seven Years Under the DMCA. Electronic Frontier Foundation. 28 November 2006. .

This article tracks the continued influence of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, specifically the "anti-circumvention" provisions of Section 1201, throughout its first seven years in effect. The Electronic Frontier Foundation argues that the DMCA has not been used as a method of blocking piracy and devices used to perpetrate it, as Congress intended it; instead, the DMCA has become a tool for big businesses to eliminate potential competition and a blockage to fair use, creativity and technological innovations. Because the DMCA "chills free expression and scientific research... jeopardizes fair use... impedes competition and innovation... [and] interferes with computer intrusion laws", the EFF argues that circumvention must be permissible. The article also contains an exhaustive list of court cases in which the DMCA has been a key factor.

Full knowledge of the restrictions of the DMCA and a general sense of the ways in which legislation has surrounded it is absolutely vital for the creation of my project; the essential goal of my project is to make a challenge to the DMCA and the restrictions that it has placed on artists, specifically in terms of digital video.

United States Copyright Office.  The Digital Millenium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. Copyright Office Summary.  United States Copyright Office.  28 November 2006. <http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf>.

This is a summary of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, created by the Copyright Office. It renders the more technical language and organization of the law itself into a much more straightforward form. It definitely says something about the polarizing nature of the DMCA that the only article which I have come across without a very strong, clear viewpoint of the subject is a pure summary; as could be expected, the Copyright Office is attempting to maintain an objective viewpoint, to whatever degree possible.

The DMCA was created as a way in which copyright law could be adapted to the questions raised by digital technologies. The most controversial section of the DMCA added a Chapter 12 to Title 17 of the United States Code; this section contains the much-talked-about "anticircumvention provisions", criminalizing any attempt to break through digital copy protection (CSS encryption on DVDs, etc.). Another section of law removes any liability for online copyright violations from online service providers as long as they adhere to certain broad guidelines. There is also the possibility of application for exemptions from the DMCA for non-infringing uses which require circumvention of encryption.

My project requires a detailed knowledge of the provisions of the DMCA itself; I not only plan to quote directly from the DMCA in my project, but also to use clips appropriated from DVDs to create the project. This summary of the law is one of the most simple and concise descriptions of its provisions, without much color in the form of personal opinions.


Voegtli, Naomi A. "Rethinking Derivative Rights" Brooklyn Law Review 63. 1213 (1997).
 
Voegtli makes a very strong argument for a new interpretation of the right to create derivative works, basing her analysis of the problem not only on legal knowledge, but also on art criticism.  She cites many important artworks that have used appropriated content - Warhol's Campbell's soup can and Brillo box, Duchamp's "readymades," and the writings of Shakespeare and T.S. Eliot; in the current climate of cease-and-desist letters, licensing fees, and multi-million dollar lawsuits, Voegtli claims, there is no room for this type of creation.  She cites many reasons that broadly interpreted derivative rights are counterintuitive to the spirit of copyright; in her words, they "inhibit socially beneficial creative activities, result in a reward system in which the size of the reward has little to do with the amount of labor put in to create the work, grant protection of exploitive use even for works with little personality interest, ignore the true nature of authorship, limit democratic discourse, and frustrate people's reasonable expectations with respect to copyrighted works."  She then moves on to discuss new standards that could be put into effect, allowing for a more logical take on the rights to derivative works.
 
Voegtli's article is very useful in the way that it carefully balances art history and criticism with copyright law; she carefully juggles information relating to Pop Art, semiotics, rap music, the 1976 Copyright Act, postmodernism and fair use standards, all in the same article.  This is a very valuable perspective on copyright issues; by having a background knowledge in art as well as legal matters, she actually is trained to make the aesthetic judgements required by copyright law.