“The Macroeconomics of Dr. Strangelove” presents an economic analysis of a hypothetical nuclear arms race between two countries. The examination attempts to uncover the economic reasoning behind a country’s desire to accumulate these weapons of mass destruction and also discusses the effect rival countries have on one another in this accumulation. The study works through the decisions made in a cold war situation as two countries progress to one of two circumstances: an equilibrium is reached and thus neither country initiates conflict or one country accumulates such a massive stock of weapons that the consequences of conflict are so large that conflict is never initiated.

The basic logic behind the cold war model is that each generation is able to chose how much weapons stock to produce and store for the next generation. The subsequent generation then has the choice of utilizing that stock to initiate nuclear conflict with the other country or adding on to the stock by producing and storing even more weaponry for their posterity. The model assumes that current generations are making decisions with future generations in mind and also that any conflict that arises will not necessarily deplete a nation’s entire supply of weapons.

As time passes in the model, countries make weapons decisions based on other nations’ possible decisions and the probability of catastrophe should conflict arise. The higher each country’s weapon stock, the higher the probability for catastrophe. A higher possibility for catastrophe makes initiation of conflict riskier for every country and thus less likely to occur. Countries react to the weapons stock of other countries though and desire to accumulate at least the same amount of weaponry as other countries. Thus, the nuclear arms races after World War II, the subject of Dr. Strangelove. This article details the various decisions that countries can make with respect to their arms stock and the reactionary steps other countries would then take.

The concluding argument of the paper is that increasing international weapons stock actually decreases the chance of conflict because the probability of catastrophe is much higher than it is with fewer weapons. The creation of a Dr. Strangelove doomsday device is based in sound logic, though not executed well, as the movie demonstrates. As countries build up their nuclear arms, this paper argues it is better to let this continue until maximum potential catastrophe has been reached.