This article highlights some of the ambiguities of VARA, such as leaving subjective and objective interpretations of harm open for debate.  Because of the broad nature of the act, court cases such as Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc, have expansive room for interpretation.  The objective approach was taken in the case of Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc.  There have been subjective interpretations, like in Pavia v. 1120 Avenue of the Americas Associates.  It is evident through legislation that Congress intended for VARA to have a narrow application, and to be used as a small step towards including moral rights in United States copyright law.  Substantial modification of a visual work is compared to the concept of substantial similarity in traditional United States copyright law, which facilitates the objective approach to interpretation of VARA.  The article also describes how if the modification to the work is considered insignificant (i.e. lighting a painting from below as opposed to above) then the artist cannot claim infringement of VARA.  By comparing significant vs. insignificant modification juxtaposed against qualitative vs. quantitative modification, the scope of and debates regarding VARA are brought to the forefront.  An interesting point is that when judging art, some argue that the judges do not have adequate training to deem modification as infringement. 
This article is important to decipher the meaning of modification of a piece of artwork.  The debate over how the act should be and is implemented highlights the ambiguities of VARA.  Because VARA is the first time moral rights are worked into United States law, its scope is narrow so it can be a test to see how the expansion of protection beyond economic rights fairs.  It is clear that debate exists, because of the possibility of subjective vs. objective interpretation; although Hawkins believes objective interpretation is much preferred.  Once again, court cases are examined to show the way the act has been applied and interpreted; therefore, Congress can gauge whether federal copyright law in general should be expanded to include moral rights, as it does in other countries.