This essay by Professor Randall C Picker is his comment to the essay “The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design”. It is from the point of view of someone who didn’t know too much about fashion until he read Kal Raustinala and Chris Sprigman’s The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual property in Fashion Design. Picker talks mainly about two points- the role of the Fashion Originators’ Guild of America and its demise and then he questions whether a piracy paradox even exists. On March 23, 1976 Time magazine carried a story called ‘Dress War’ which was a discussion of the legal issues happening between the Boston department store Filene and the then newly created Fashion Originators’ Guild of America. Picker states that this guild was set up to protect fashion and deal with ‘style piracy’. Picker says that the Time magazine article describes all the dirty tricks that people would use in the fashion industry. He then uses an excerpt from the piece to show this. The excerpt says that by the early Depression years style piracy was a huge thing, if an item came out in stores in the morning and was priced at $60, by the evening it would have been copied and would be in other stores priced at $25 and later in the week, at even lower prices. Picker explains that the way the Guild dealt with all this was by organizing a registration system and by boycotting stores that sold copies. He then uses the Time magazine story again to analyze whether the Guild’s efforts of protection actually did lead to more creativity and newer fashions. He says that Raustinala and Sprigman in their paper were dubious as to whether the Guild actually wanted more property rights but in his opinion what the Guild was doing was definitely wanted by high- end designers.

Picker’s next main point is about Fashion Durability. he talks of an article from the New York Times in 1947 which says that Maurice Retner, the former head of the Guild wanted legislation in America to be modeled on French legislation. Leon Bendel Schulmen of Henri Bendel on the other hand didn’t really care and was happy living without property rights. he said that by the time anyone could copy his designs, the design itself would be on its way out. Picker argues that famous designs get copied and sold to the masses. People who want ti be dressed in the best and are very fashion conscious would not want to be associated with the masses and what they wear. High-end fashion designers see this and produce something new for this elite market to wear, there by starting a cycle that keeps the fashion market alive. He argues that creating a fashion copyright would only ensure high-end designers the ability to raise their prices and differentiate themselves. The Piracy Paradox paper really questions whether creativity can be sustained without protection. Picker in this essay asks whether the price is worth it.

This source would be useful for my paper as it is an insight into a very interesting paper. I questions the validity of what the authors have written regarding a magazine article that I crucial in this field. I will use this source to help me analyze the issue of sustaining creativity without protection. I will further explore what the paper says about the Guild and how Picker’s interpretation is different to that in the paper he is commenting on.

In this paper, Lisa J Hedrick, argues against a copyright for fashion designs. Before laying down her stance, she spells out all the facts and then goes onto to articulate her own opinion. She uses a brilliant quote from the blockbuster movie The Devil Wears Prada, to begin her paper.  

The fashion industry thrives on glitz, glamour, not to mention change. The shelf life of a product or a design in this lucrative industry is only a few months at the most, making the turnaround  time very fast. Hedrick argues against copyright saying that the cost of litigation would be so high it would be irrational to protect something with such a short shelf life.  

Hedrick begins her paper by explaining the current state of intellectual property law and its failure to protect fashion. The ambiguity of the definitions of the words ‘fashion design’, ‘design’ and ‘apparel’ in The Design Piracy Bills is a major concern and can be projected as being seen as a major reason why fashion won’t actually be copyrighted in a proper manner, if the bills are passed. The many restrictions that will indirectly be put in place by these  bills might eventually cripple the industry. Designers will have to think twice before creating something and to ensure that their goods will be protected by these bills. Hedrick brings up an interesting issue of “conceptual separability” that already exists within current copyright law. It is the only concept under which fashion designs are provided with a minimal amount of protection. But even so, there are numerous tests that the designs have to pass, as Hedrick points out, for them to be protected. For instance a certain item of design or piece of clothing needs to pass the test of whether the button is original or not even the most minor alterations to an item of clothing. 

Hedrick talks of the proposed Fashion design protection under the Bills and later compares current Fashion protection in different parts of the world. European fashion copyright protection with its concept of  the Community design system, would be the closest thing that could be compared with what American fashion protection is aiming for. However the differences in the legal processes between the two demographics make it hard to compare the situation.  

This paper is very essential as a source: not only does Hedrick argue the same point as I do, but she also goes to great lengths to fully explain the legal situation. Her meticulous and thorough method of approaching the issue fully inform the reader of the current scenario. She has also explained this well and even points to a direction where fashion copyright might work. Her sound argument makes for a crucial source.  

U.S. Congress. House. Design Piracy Prohibition Act. 110th Cong., 1st sess., H.R. 2033. (25 April 2007).

This is one piece of legislation proposed to protect fashion designs from piracy. This Design Piracy Prohibition Act would basically give fashion designs protection for three years after the application for registration is submitted. Within this act, the terms fashion design, design, and apparel are defined so as to create a definition of what can actually be protected under this bill. The reason these are defined within this bill is the ambiguous nature of these words. Without a clear definition, there would be way too many interpretations of the clauses of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act. The bill also states the terms for submitting a design for copyright protection. Basically, any rights to protection are lost if the design is not submitted within three months after the design is made public. The bill also briefly lists the monetary penalties for any pirates if found guilty of copyright infringement.

This bill is an important source for any paper on fashion copyright since it provides an example of the types of legislation that would supply design protection. Even though this bill has not gone through, many of the Design Piracy Bills follow this basic structure for fashion copyright. Therefore, this source provides an example of how effective bills can be in providing protection. In addition, many sources reference this bill and its contents. So, it is useful to have the actual bill and its wording to look back upon and analyze as a primary source. The bill basically amends title 17 in the United States Code to provide for fashion design protection. By looking at how proponents of fashion copyright will protect fashion designs, I can decide, within my paper, whether these laws are beneficial or effective enough to even bother enacting. Thomas, the site where this bill is located, also provides a list of sponsors for this bill. There are only fourteen sponsors, which creates suspicion as to how effective or plausible this bill may actually be. Information like this surrounding pieces of legislation make bills useful sources.

Raustiala, Kal and Sprigman, Chris "The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design." Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, p. 1687, 2006; UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 06-04. http://ssrn.com/abstract=878401

This detailed article is an in depth view of both sides of the fashion copyright debate. Rather than simply looking at and supporting only one viewpoint on this controversial issue, the authors address both angles to the fashion copyright controversy. They then proceed to prove why support of low IP protection is the better choice despite arguments made in support of fashion copyright laws. This article describes the fashion industry as unique since it continually produces original content while its main creative element remains outside of copyright protection. This appears to condradict the theory of IP rights which claims that copying, which is rampant in the fashion industry, smothers the incentive for innovation. The article then presents the reader with the two overarching arguments. The argument for increased copyright protection within the fashion industry is more of a moral rights claim. This side claims the lack of current fashion design protection is an injustice to the immense creativity put into the creation of apparel. The other side looks at the unique nature of the fashion industry. They claim copying drives the cycle that makes fashion such a thriving, innovative industry. The article then proceeds to delve into past attempts at copyright protection for fashion. One failed attempt was made by the Fashion Originators' Guild of America: they made a deal between designers and retailers to refuse the sale of any copied apparel and boycotted any member of the guild who violated this rule. Since clothing and apparel are considered utilitarian objects, copyright should not apply to fashion design. Patents and trade dress also are not effective methods of protecting copyright. Although trademark is used by designers, it can only be used to protect names and logos, not entire designs. Therefore, bills like HR 5055 are suggested by groups like the CFDA. One of the main concepts of this paper is how induced obsolescene and the positional nature of apparel drive the fashion cycle, which would be incredibly slow and ineffective without copying. In addition, Raustiala and Sprigman explain how free appropriation helps to anchor trends in the industry. So, they conclude that due to induced obsolescene and anchoring of trends, the fashion industry has remained stable despite rampant copying. Finally, the authors address the copyright system in the European Union and how even with protection laws, very few design infringment cases come to court. Additionally, due to the litigious culture of the United States, copyright protection in the US would simply flood the courts with unnecessary cases and reduce innovation due to fear of suit.

This article is of extreme importance to any research regarding the issue of fashion copyright. The article is unique among other scholarly works on this issue in that rather than just delving into one side of the debate, the authors address the arguments on both sides of this fashion copyright war. This is an extremely useful method and structure since it provides the reader with insight into both arguments. However, the article is then strengthened by analyses of both arguments and subsequent counterarguments against those supporting fashion copyright. Since my topic revolves around whether fashion copyright should be enacted or not, having both argments laid out within one coherent paper is extremely beneficial. The paper also looks at previous attempts at fashion copyright. This is important in building the history and basis of design protection in my paper and why these laws should not be enacted in the present day. This article is very important in building the foundation of my argument.

Barnett, Jonathan, Grolleau, Gilles and Harbi, Sana El. "The Fashion Lottery: Cooperative Innovation in Stochastic Markets." USC CLEO Research Paper No. C08-17; USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 08-21. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1241005

This article puts an economic spin or an economist's viewpoint on the fashion copyright debate. In other words, it applies economic principles to the fashion industry to show why an incomplete property regime, not complete copyright protection, is the most sensible situation for the fashion industry. To build this argument, the author first explains the concept of "fashion risk," the main economic problem in fashion. Due to demand uncertainty in the fashion industry, it is difficult to forsee if a new design will be successful. So, designers need a system of collective insurance to balance the losses from seasonal product failure and the risk of firm bankruptcy. This collective insurance comes from designers allowing limited imitation which maximizes earnings in the long run. Basically, how this economic idea works is that the designer that produces the "winning" design for that season earns a larger prize, keeping the incentive for innovation alive. However, the incomplete property regime also gives smaller profits to the "losing" designers as a kind of insurance against the "fashion risk." This method is termed the "winner take most" approach. The article then transitions into three different types of imitation: mark perfection, design perfection, and quality perfection. These are then related to three different methods of imitation: horizontal imitation, legitimate vertical imitation (knockoffs), and illegitimate vertical imitation (counterfeits). Basically, horizontal imitation is copying among high end designers while vertical imitation is copying of elite designs by lower end fashion designers in a trickle down effect. As stated previously, the fundamental economic problem for designers is demand uncertainty and the associated risk of bankruptcy. By allowing horizontal imitation and legitimate vertical imitation, this risk is greatly reduced. An obvious way to success for the majority of the market is to wait until the winning design is determined for the season by the consumers and then release imitation products as this eliminates risk and increases success. However, this would kill innovation. So, the best solution is incomplete protection-positive yet constrained imitation. The economics equations show that to maximize final wealth and minimize the variance of final wealth incomplete, not complete, property regimes are required. This can be explained by the idea that at one extreme the winner does not make enough and so incentive is low. At the other extreme, insurance is too low and risk is too high. Both of these cases lead to underinnovation. In short, some imitation supports design innovation while too much or too little undermines it. Therefore, only the very few elite firms can afford the complete copyright protection suggested by bills such as the Design Piracy Prohibition Act.

This article is a very unique way to approach this fashion copyright war. It is an invaluable asset to my argument against enacting fashion design protection laws. This article basically utilizes economical principles to build mathematical equations proving that incomplete copyright protection or rejection of recently proposed copyright laws is more beneficial to society than enacting complete protection for fashion designs. The organization of this paper with alternating pieces of mathematical equations and textual analysis creates an extremely convincing and almost indisputable argument due to the logical thought process this method of presentation creates. This article greatly enhances my argument in that it provides an alternative viewpoint, particularly an economist's angle, which still points towards the same conclusion: fashion copyright laws should not be enacted.

Hedrick, Lisa J. "Tearing Fashion Design Protection Apart at the Seams." Washington and Lee Law Review, Vol. 65, No. 1, pp. 215-273, 2008. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1127190

This article presents both side of the copyright debate more in terms of the pieces of legislation proposed for fashion copyright. It goes through the pros and cons of either side of the fashion copyright argument and then argues against the enactment of these laws. Fashion design falls within the negative space of copyright protection. Therefore, designers cannot prevent knockoffs of their original designs. This paper acknowledges that these knockoffs are harmful as they hurt the designer's profits and reputation due to the low quality of imitation products. Piracy causes almost $12 billion of loss in the fashion year annually. The paper is set up this way and the author then skillfully uses all these facts that seem to support fashion copyright to show why copyright laws are ineffective in stopping any of these problems. First of all, terms such as fashion design, apparel, and design are extremely ambiguous but are used within the Design Piracy Bills. This is simply because fashion is hard to define and consequently very difficult to protect. The author also explains that fashion also cannot effectively use patents, trademark, trade dress, or copyright (due to its utilitarian function) for protection purposes. In addition to the vagueness of fashion lingo, the Design Piracy Bills would simply cause congestion of the courts with senseless cases due to the extreme subjectivity that would be involved in fashion court cases. Even if the bills went through, there are so many loopholes that pirates can find within these bills to basically render any protection useless. Finally, Hedrick looks at the fashion laws in the European Union and shows that even with laws hardly any cases come to court regarding piracy. However, she points out the cultural differences in that America is much more litigious and these laws could force designers to pay large amounts of money for lawyers to protect clothing that has a short shelf life. In addition, there is no guarantee that courts will even be able to punish pirates. It is also very possible that the laws enacted in the US would be much stronger than those in the European Union, which could lead to monopolies that would stifle creativity. Although Hedrick is opposed to these laws, she does make some suggestions on how to improve fashion copyright dealings if these laws go through. Overall though, her basic argument is that effective protection by Congress for fashion design is impossible. So, no protection is better than minimal protection. Any benefits that might arise from design protection would diminish rapidly with the cost and time of court decisions on piracy.

This source is obviously beneficial to my argument since it supports my thesis. However, the importance of this source is due to the rational and legal method used by the author to argue against fashion copyright. The author basically looks at the problems with the fashion industry at present and then shows the correlating proposed laws. However, she then analyses these legal proposals to show that they are extremely ineffective at solving the issues surrounding the fashion industry. If anything, these "solutions" might actually make things worse. The argument basically concludes that the fashion industry is inherently incapable of useful intellectual property protection. Therefore, time and energy should not be wasted on implementing laws that will most likely not benefit the industry.

Picker, Randal C. "Of Pirates and Puffy Shirts: A Comment on the Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design." Virginia Law Review, Forthcoming; University of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 328. http://ssrn.com/abstract=959727

This article takes the side of those individuals supporting the enactment of fashion copyright. This argument is made using past attempts at employing fashion copyright laws to protect designs and the results of these attempts. One major example used to support this claim of positive effects resulting from design protection is the Fashion Originators' Guild of America. This guild basically organized registration and monitoring for apparel with a threat of boycott of any retailer who sold knockoffs. The claim here is that this increased intellectual property protection resulted in greater innovation efforts. Although the Federal Trade Commission took down this organization, the article argues that the fact that it formed demonstrates that high end designers do want greater protection. This argument is made against other claims that the members of the industry do not even want increased protection. The argument then continues into the present time and the benefits these laws would endow on the fashion industry. With fashion design protection, high end designers can make credible promises to their consumers, which is impossible with the current amount of knockoffs in the market. With the ability to make credible commitments, high end designers could raise their prices and make more money off their original designs. Therefore, there is clearly a benefit to high end designers that accompanies increased protection. Also, the author argues that imitation in the industry is only one sided with the high end designers having to deal with the rapid imitation of their original designs. With copyright, these designers could promise their consumers that this rapid copying of the apparel they are buying would not occur. Basically, the author here argues that the rampant copying in the fashion industry is detrimental to the high end designers and their customers. Therefore, copyright protection is necessary to protect their rights and keep low end designers from exploiting the low protection regime of the fashion industry.

Although this source complicates my thesis by working against my claims that fashion copyright laws should not be enacted, sources like these are absolutely necessary to develop a strong paper. These claims will provide something for me to argue against and prove incorrect in my argument. Without addressing opposing opinions, the argument and paper would be weak. This article clearly utilizes an analysis of the high end or elite designers to support the claim for increased fashion design protection. However, it avoids looking at the effect of copyright laws on the rest of the fashion industry. However, it is still a useful source as it provides the perspective of a high end designer, the biggest victim of piracy or imitation.

Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, Committe on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives. Design Law: Are Special Provisions Needed to Protect Unique Industries-Testimony of Fashion Designer Narciso Rodriguez.  14 February 2008.

This source is a testimony by Narciso Rodriguez, a fashion designer and board member of the Council of Fashion Designers of America. This testimony is in favor of HR 2033, the Design Piracy Prohibition Act. He first presents some astounding figures such as the annual loss of at least $12 billion in the fashion industry due to piracy. He then takes the audience or reader through an almost emotional trip by explaining all the training, hard work, and money that goes into becoming a designer. With all the time and money invested within the fashion industry, pirates are just making a risky business riskier. He then constructs an argument for fashion copyright using a sad, personal anecdote. In other words, he plays on emotions and moral rights to make his point. He basically recounts a story about an original design he made that was copied and sold by pirates millions of times. Without protection for fashion design, US companies arise with piracy as their business model. These companies can afford to make large quantities at low prices, causing more sales for the pirating companies than for the original designer. Rodriguez then suggests the positive results of enacting copyright. Pirate companies would be forced to hire real designers, increasing the job market for designers and creating a great choice of original designs for consumers. He admits that in the past clothing was a functional object and therefore did not require protection. However, he believes that fashion has now become an art that is no longer just utilitarian. He then addresses the other side's concerns by claiming that only truly unique designs will be copyrighted, not all designs. He also states that the three year protection period will simply allow designers to reach the market before the pirates. After these three years and with a large public domain still in existence, previous designs can still be used for inspiration. He also addresses the concern that this will increase apparel prices by claiming that accessibly priced clothing will still exist, but the creation of these derivative lines will be through the original designer. Through explanation like these, Rodriguez attempts to passify the concerns on the scope of the legislation of copyright opponents.

This testimony by Narciso Rodriguez is very beneficial since it is a primary source coming from an elite fashion designer. It provides the viewpoint of someone within the fashion industry. Rodriguez begins his argument with a very emotional approach regarding his personal experiences and losses due to piracy. After getting the audience's sympathy, he provides some positive benefits of enacting copyright. He concludes his argument by addressing the concerns of the skeptics of fashion copyright. Rodriguez is a biased source since he obviously can benefit if the copyright laws are enacted. However, his testimony provides some real insight into the minds of fashion designers and the actual issues they face due to piracy. Therefore, this article provides a better sense of the real problems plauging the industry and if these laws can actually address these issues. So, although this testimony may not support my thesis, it provides better issues to address and counterargue than secondary sources would.

Rangnath, Rashmi. "Design Protection for Fashion Design and Autoparts: A Bad Idea Times Two." Public Knowledge Blog. http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/1399. February 16, 2008.

This blog considers the design protection for fashion designs and autoparts in terms of markets and niches. In terms of fashion design, the author argues that knockoffs do not damage the market for original designs much at all. Obviously there is some effect on the original designer, but the author argues that this effect is negligible due to the different markets that original designs and knockoffs compete within. Customers who can afford to buy runway designs are going to buy these original designs regardless of how many imitation versions are circulating. This is because the people who are willing to pay so much for clothing want to be able to tell others they are wearing an original. For them, only the original can give them the status they desire. On the other hand, people who cannot afford these original designs do not care if their clothing gives them status. In actuality, these customers still would not purchase the original design if the knockoffs were not present in the industry. These consumers are fine with the lower quality imitation once the trend trickles down. For this reason, elite and original fashion designers have no need to lower their prices to compete with knockoffs and imitations. This is because these two versions are marketing and selling to two different groups of people. They are operating within two different markets. Finally, the blog ends with an attack on elite designers who claim pirates end up selling more imitation versions than the designers can even imagine to sell of their original. The author argues here that in the elite market, the designer can sell very few items at a incredibly high price while pirates may sell thousands of products, but at virtually nothing compared to the original's price. Therefore, the elite designers probably come out ahead in terms of profit. The author makes a correlating argument against autopart design protection, which does not apply to the topic of interest.

This blog was chosen as a source for my paper because it has a very unique approach in looking at fashion designs and their imitations. Rather than looking at the logistics of the fashion industry or as someone from within the fashion industry, this blog arrives at this issue from the viewpoint of a consumer. In other words, the blog looks at the various classes of consumers and their different markets in order to suggest that imitation is not really harming anyone to an extent where copyright laws need to be enacted. By looking at the fashion copyright debate from a consumer and market viewpoint, this blog provides incredible support for my thesis by showing that a lack of copyright laws in fashion actually helps the industry thrive in all consumer markets. With design protection, the market for low end customers may very well be knocked out since a majority of consumers do not shop around in both low and high end markets.

The "little black dress" is a universally known fashion phenomena. However, almost no one can claim the rights to originally designing this fashion garment that lives in every woman's closet. The fashion industry is full of trends and apparel, like the "little black dress," where the origin is unknown due to the vast varieties and imitations of each original design. Due to this rampant copying present within the fashion industry, past and present, a group of individuals has started rallying support for fashion design protection against piracy. Although imitation of original designs by elite designers is widespread in the fashion industry, this very phenomena is what makes the fashion industry so incredibly successful and creates overall economic and long term industrial benefits for the majority of designers, retailers, manufacturers, and consumers. Therefore, fashion copyright laws should not be enacted since the results will be detrimental for a vast majority of the fashion industry. The fashion industry has been thriving for ages and nothing has changed to create need for new protection laws except for the greed of a select minority of elite designers and lawyers. Therefore, we can say the fashion industry is packed with inspired pioneers rather than infringing pirates.

 

This article introduces another argument to support the one that states that pirates can actually be beneficial to the original producers of fashion products. The authors render that pirates are not merely copiers. On the contrary, they often inspire high-end fashion designers in new directions. Specifically, the article cites the example of Fred Nuovo, the designer of the Nokia luxury brand, recognizing his idea of creating Vertu came from pirates who were selling counterfeit Nokia phones with diamonds on them. In addition, the article describes an incident in which Coco Chanel, a high-end fashion designer, used raffia in her collection after her press secretary bought a counterfeit Coco Chanel knockoff outfit that had included raffia trim, a detail the original lacked. If this were to be true, the usually pirated firms are the ones who are pirating from the so-called "pirates." In the conclusion, the article admits that the overall impact on social welfare remains ambiguous and calls for further research into this topic as a whole.

This article adds another argument that is important for my topic: that often producers not only gain financial benefits from pirates, but that they also often take creative ideas and details from counterfeited products. In addition, I appreciate the way that the author notes that the beneficial gains from pirating are still, at this point, ambiguous and that further research is needed to be conducted in order to fully understand the implications piracy has on fashion designers and their revenue of sales.

 

 

This article's overall argument is that although counterfeiting is a criminal activity, the act of counterfeiting is not always damaging to brands and can actually work to a brand's advantage. The author lists numerous ways in which this is accomplished, such as that it can increase a brand's awareness and desirability in the public's eye. A new way of looking at how counterfeited products help the original is by analyzing who is purchasing the counterfeits. The article argues that the people who buy the fake products are not financially able to buy the original, and that if they were, they would be the first in line to purchase the original. In this way, the increased brand exposure only helps to entice those who are able to buy the original. The counterfeit proves as no competition for the original. Another new piece of argumentation is that it closes off competition. The author notes that high priced branded goods encourage competition at slightly lower prices. Then, the "fake" products are priced as significantly lower prices. Thus, the competition is squeezed out because it is prices out of the top market by the original brand and is unable to compete with the very low prices of counterfeited products.

            I chose this article to use for my final project because it clearly explains that way in which counterfeited products eliminate the real competition for the original higher priced products. This adds a new dimension to my argument because previous articles did not deal with the actual competition of the original producers of fashion goods in the way that this author does.

 

 

This article argues against the thinking enforced by the incentive thesis, which argues for strict enforcement of intellectual property rights against piracy, or imitation. According to this theory, if the original producers are not protected, they will lose the incentive to produce new items. The article states that counterfeiting in fact does not always diminish the original producers' innovation incentives. The author gives two reasons to back up his argument. First, the introduction of copies will increase the amount of money that the elite are willing to pay for the original fashion product. In addition, the fact that a product is being copied will increase the desirability of the product to the non-elite consumers. Because of this increase in perceived desirability, such consumers will believe that the status benefits acquired from owning the product make the product worthy of a purchase. Thus, not only will the elite increase their purchasing of the item, but the non-elite consumers will also more often buy the fashion good. Both increase the producer's revenues on sales of the original, despite the counterfeiting.

This article is important for my topic because it argues against the need for protection against counterfeit products. Here, the consumer is not only the one being aided by the pirates, but the producer, too, is gaining more benefits, in the form of an increase in the revenue of sales on a fashion good, with the appearance of counterfeited products. I think it is important to note that the author specifies the counterfeiting is "imperfect," which increases the desirability of the product, both for the elite and non-elite consumers.

 

 

This article questions why the fashion industry has failed to secure U.S. copyright protection for its designs, despite the rampant view that piracy is an extremely fatal and potentially destructive threat to the drive to engage in creative pursuits. It tracks the film, music, software, and publishing industries, illustrating that such industries have used this argument for demanding increased legal protection. On the other hand, fashion firms and designers have not. The author gives several reasons for his argument. First, the article states that even original producers are sometimes copiers themselves. Different designers at different times set the trends for a season, and all engage in copying at some point. Also, because of the fashion industry's quick design cycle, a firm's position as either copier or originator is constantly and very swiftly changing. Furthermore, the article notes that the fashion industry is dependent on whether or not the consumer is aware of the newest trends. Thus, widespread copying results in some coherence. There is always a range of new designs produced each season, and the counterfeited products make clear to the consumers was is "trendy" at the time.

            This article is important for my overall topic because it gives claim to the argument that lack of protection rights for top designers are actually increasing the sales for these designers' products. Without counterfeiting, the American public will not be aware of what is "trendy," which would result in greater distribution of sales, but less concentrated sales for a particular design. Also, it gives substance to the argument that all designers borrow from one another at some point, for the industry is constantly evolving.