James Surowiecki outlines through cultural examples the basic idea of collective intelligence and that time after time it is shown that the group estimate to a given problem is more accurate than most of all of the individual guesses. He then lays out a key set of characteristics for what makes a wise crowd. They are: diversity of opinion, meaning that users come from many different intellectual backgrounds; independence, that they do not rely heavily on the opinions of others; decentralized, meaning people can draw upon local knowledge, and a means for aggregating their opinions. He states that while the average is often mediocre in most cases, in decision making it is most often the best. Though he also states that collective intelligence is not always perfect, citing certain examples where experts certainly know better than the crowd.

Surowiecki lays out the particular parameters I will esxamine as a starting point in my research project in looking at the particular incentives of marketing techniques used to maintain a flourishing prediction market. The implications for data gathered from prediction markets will examine the future role of experts, building off of Surowiecki's comments. In addition this work will mark the branching off point from where I examine other definitions of "wise crowds" and how important his characteristics actually are.

In chapter six, Jenkins discusses the role of popular culture in emerging political communities. Jenkins (as is the case throughout Convergence Culture) is focused on how old and new media interact and the dynamics of collaboration and participation. While Jenkins recognizes the scoff-factor when implying the concept of “photoshop for democracy” (user-generated images that often map themes from popular culture onto the political campaign) is any sort of substitute for real political activism, he insists that this kind of user-generated content and mass dispersion is a serious act of citizenry. In fact, using popular culture as a means of engaging voters might just be the most effective way of re-establishing interest in politics as a part of our everyday lives. Jenkins focuses on the 2004 election and recognizes that the next step is to think of “democratic citizenship as a lifestyle.” Furthermore, online political communities seem to be segregating voters, as opposed to encouraging dialogue across ideologies. Although he seems to offer popular culture as a kind of national balm for the ailments of political fragmentation, Jenkins recognizes the inherent limits of its role in (or applicability as a model for) contemporary political communities.

For me, the most useful parts of this argument is the attention he pays to the increasing participation of average Americans (now as monitorial citizens as opposed to informed citizens) in the media landscape and the possibilities for the integration of politics and popular culture. However, he doesn’t seem to offer any real solution for the acutely polarized political landscape.