As Alfred Yen, professor of law at the Boston College Law School, states in his introduction, this article "studies the construction of third party copyright liability in light of the recent Supreme Court case Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v Grokster, Ltd.” The article is broken up into five sections: the first describes the doctrines that governed third party liability before Grokster, the second uses “fault and strict liability to expose the theoretical and practical tradeoffs implicit I these differing constructions, the third analyzes the case itself, the fourth describes the implications of the decision and “sets forth the general contours of an improved, post-Grokster­ construction of third party copyright liability, and the fifth gives some thought to the future of this subject matter.

The Grokster case is the latest in a series of cases where an internet service provider has been prosecuted for the actions of its users. Yet, even with this new decision in the books, little progress has been made to determine who is really the most responsible for infringement or how to hold them adequately responsible. Yen writes that “third part copyright liability benefits society by encouraging individuals to stop others from infringing, but those benefits come at a price… third party copyright liability suppresses non-infringing as well as infringing behavior.” Overall, this paradox illustrates the biggest deficit of internet copyright law: the inability to find the balance between, in Yen’s words, “desirable and undesirable consequences” of new technology. At this point in time, there seems to be no obvious strategy for regulating the internet without stifling future innovation and creation.

This article points out that although Grokster “gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to straighten out the law of third party copyright liability” little to no progress was actually made in interpreting pre-Grokster doctrines of third party copyright liability. Instead of “choosing between” existing “differing interpretations” of the law, Yen writes that the court “adopted a dormant theory of third party copyright liability, inducement.” Overall, Yen’s article shows that “inducement give courts a new tool for holding culpable defendants liable which reducing the risk of undesirable side effects.” Yen describes the Grokster decision as being “not a landmark, so much as a milestone, ratifying a continuing détente between those who build on the Internet and those in a position to regulate the builders.” This decision has also turned the focus of internet gate keeping to controlling software and PC uses ability to run that software rather than the ability to control the entire network.

Whether or not one agrees with the merit of the new inducement doctrine, this article is a comprehensive look at an area of copyright law that is important and continuing to quickly evolve. The story of these laws will continue to change drastically in the years to come, but this is a useful, informative and through-provoking look at the situation thus far.

In this article, Andrew Beckerman-Rodau asks whether the Grokster ruling was really a good decision or simply judicial activism. Judicial activism refers to the practice of a court not interpreting the law as it already exists but rather legislating from the bench and creating new legal interpretations. Beckerman-Rodau writes that the Grokster decision rightly recognizes “the conflicting goals which had to be balanced: protecting intellectual property to promote creative activities; and, the importance of not impeding creative and innovative conduct.”

Overall, Beckerman-Rodau also writes that the Grokster decision “does not represent a novel interpretation of the law. Rather, it is consistent with the underlying principles of intellectual property law and it is based on established unfair competition theory which is supported by existing precedent.”

The article begins with “an overview of the decision,” first looking at the facts of the case. Then it discusses what the court did decide – the application of the inducement theory – and what it did not decide – the ramifications of the Sony decision in this context. Then it goes on to deal with the underlying policy considerations of the case. In both Sony and Grokster the same conflicting policy concerns are raised, which deal with “the underlying policy of promoting creativity and innovation by granting property protection for the results of such activity versus withholding such property protection to avoid impeding technological developments.” Beckerman-Rodau states that “copyright law exists to provide benefits to the public, not to maximize economic benefit flowing to a creator.” The Grokster decision went in favor of the content holders, those looking to reap the maximum economic benefit.

The article continues by looking at the application of the new inducement theory. First, it looks at the iPod, stating that although the device has illegal uses and Apple is aware of the potential for infringement the knowledge alone is not enough to hold them liable. The fact that Apple has provided iPod owners with a legal model for acquiring music, iTunes, only further helps Apple avoid liability. Secondly, the article looks at the legality of DVRS – meaning digital video recorders such as Tivo. Again, this service does not encourage users to engage in illegal activity and does not intend for infringing activities to be its primary usage.

Finally Beckerman-Rodau concludes with a recommendation for the lower courts’ application of the Grokster decision. He writes that a good way to balance the concerns of chilling innovation with the concerns of allowing infringement to occur “would be to require sufficient proof of intent to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard for inducement liability. This would avoid chilling innovation because inducement liability would only apply in situations where it is obvious that a product is being distributed with the clear intent that it be used for infringing activity. Additionally, this heightened standard would not affect the ability of a copyright owner to sue direct infringers.”

Whether courts will take this sort of advice is yet to be determined, but Beckerman-Rodau clearly states that the court, in this instance, was not legislating from the bench and instead codifying “preexisting judicially recognized doctrines” in order to make a ruling in contentious legal territory. As Beckerman-Rodau suggests, online copyright liability is an area of law that is only beginning to come into the forefront of legal decision making and liability discussions and will be debated long into the future.

This Article points out the critical short-coming of the Grokster case: the inability to answer the question of what a technology vendor can be held liable for. Instead, the court announced a new doctrine for copyright – inducement – which is certainly a viable way of dealing with the situation, but fails to contend with information that was already on the table. Instead of somehow using the copyright legislature already in circulation to deal with the Grokster case, the court decided to shift focus and contend with a new doctrine.

Author Fred von Lohmann writes that this new decision leaves technology companies and their attorneys to “pick their way through a dangerous minefield of legal uncertainties.” Really, the problem is not the new doctrine of inducement itself, but the “continued uncertainty surrounding the traditional doctrines of contributory infringement and vicarious liability.”

Overall, this article states that legal uncertainty is particularly chilling to innovators because of the problem of statutory damages. Sometimes the penalties for technology end up being put on such a large scale that they can be looked at as a “corporate death penalty” because insurance is unavailable for such large claims. Sometimes, even just one of these sorts of claims can bankrupt a company. But, in contrast, patent law has no similar provision and additionally, patent claims are made primarily against copporations while in copyright, claims can be made not just against the company as a whole, but against the individual officers, directors and corporate investors. Therefore, the uncertainly left as a result of refusing to deal with contributory or vicarious infringement claims is thoroughly problematic and will only cause future courts and cases to continue to contend with the same problems, which could’ve been put to rest if the courts had chosen to deal with them.

The uncertainty surrounding contributory and vicarious infringement is not only troubling for future legal proceedings but also “chilling” for current and future innovators. The risks and uncertainties involved with these undecided doctrines propose trouble for innovators and investors of new multipurpose technologies because having substantial non-infringing uses may no longer be enough of a guarantee that a product will be allowed to be distributed.

Lohmann proposes that “if the Supreme Court is unwilling to address the scope of secondary liability, perhaps it is time for Congress to address copyright remedies.” He also feels that Congress should “abolish statutory damages for secondary copyright claims” because this would “leave copyright owners injunctive remedies and actual damages, putting them in no worse a position than litigants in most other areas of civil law.” This change would allow companies and investors to be able to make “reasonable business decisions about manageable levels of legal risk” without fear of unpredictable or unprecedented legal standards that could completely bankrupt their company or hinder their production beyond repair.

Brian P. Wilkner discusses in this article the effects of the Sony v. Universal and MGM v. Grokster on the newest batch of cases that will "pit mainstream, consumer-participation-oriented companies against copyright owners".  The article gives background information on both the Sony and Grokster cases and talks about the contributory liability doctrine, and how the Sony decision limited the power of this doctrine by stating that Sony's VCR had significant non-infringing uses.  On the other hand, it noted the Napster and Grokster cases which found each music file sharing company guilty of copyright infringement, and therefore were illegal.  Napster's fatal flaw, writes Wilkner, was the fact that they had a centralized indexing system that gave the creators of Napster too much knowledge of what was actually being shared on their website.  Grokster attempted to circumvent this problem by creating a decentralized index which "deprived their creators of any knowledge of infringing activity".  The Supreme Court ultimately ruled against them, saying that companies that distribute a device with clear intentions of promoting copyright infringement were illegal, and that Grokster's claim that they were unable to stop copyright infringement from taking place demonstrated an "unlawful objective".  One of the interesting tidbits about the Grokster case was that the court did not rule on the limits of the Sony decision, as many court observers thought they would.

Wilkner then goes on to talk about "inverse Grokster scenarios",  which he says will "pit content owners against legitimate organizations seeking to capitalize on the demand for interactivity".  Companies like Google, MySpace, and YouTube, he states, will not make statements or take actions to promote copyright infringement, but will maintain day-to-day operations with the knowledge that some copyright infringing content is being viewed or placed on their sites.  This is in direct contrast with Grokster, which claimed ignorance by stating it was unaware of any infringement taking place on its site.  The article ends with Wilkner proposing a "test" of the inverse Grokster dilemma in which the courts will have to decide whether the public benefit from these sites outweighs the property rights of copyright holders. 

Amanda Bronstad in this article writes about the differences between the copyright infringement cases that ultimately doomed music file sharing sites like Napster and Grokster and the current batch of cases involving video sharing sites like YouTube.  On one side of the argument, video sharing sites say that a major percentage of their content is perfectly legitimate and legal.  Also, these sites, especially YouTube, point out that they remove content considered to be copyright infringing immediately after they are notified by the copyright holder.  This did not happen with music file sharing sites. However, lawyers for Hollywood's major studios say that their case is bolstered by the fact that they now have a precedent in MGM v. Grokster.  They argue that web sites know they make money off of this infringing material, and therefore are liable for induced infringement.  They also say that video sharing sites may be considered direct infringers because of the role these sites take in editing user content.

Bronstad also notes that while the recent agreements between YouTube and major studios such as Universal, Warner, and CBS does help legitimize the site, the agreements aren't necessarily "suit proof".  She says that many experts in the field see a major gray area that could be exploited by an ambitious company or law firm.  She says that the debate will ultimately come down to the DMCA's "safe harbor provision", and whether or not these video sites have put in place and enforced rules to protect themselves from future legal issues.  She says that the strongest safe harbor these companies have is the ability to remove copyright infringing material from their sites.  If sites continue to consistently remove copyright infringing content, as YouTube has done over the last few months, then these companies will have a strong legal foundation for their business models.