Edward Samuels argues that the extension of copyright law is not a result of a scheme by corporations to cheat the public but rather a part of a system that the framers of the Constitution had in mind in order to “promote the progress of science and useful arts” by “securing, for limited times, to authors, and inventors, and the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries”.  Samuels identifies six categories of the public domain, which have all supported the expansion of copyright. Samuels writes that, “In all six areas, the public domain advocates were making arguments against the tide; they lamented the expansion of copyright but could hardly claim that the public domain analysis had in fact already worked its way into dominant copyright theory”. Samuels notes that protectionists of the act try and justify the copyright law based upon natural rights, moral rights and property rights, all of which public domain advocates argue in objection to heavily, however, Samuels argues that the natural rights and property rights are “firmly rooted in copyright history” and that it is recognized as the basis for copyright protection in civil law and outer countries outside of England and the US. Samuels goes on in his article to discuss the Eldred case and argues for the support of the case. He notes that the D.C Circuit Court concluded, “Copyrights are categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment”. The petitioners of copyright extension argue that the premise of CTEA violated the “limited Times” provision of the Copyright Clause and that Congress can only grant rights in the case that it will promote the creation of new works.  They argue that the extension act of 1998 is unconstitutional, but Samuels then asks if that is unconstitutional, are all other proceeding acts unconstitutional as well and therefore have no stopping point. Therefore, Samuels argues, the Supreme Court should not endorse any approach the petitioners present.

    This article is important to my topic because it discusses the rationale behind opposing or supporting the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, the premise of my paper. Samuels outlines the arguments that advocates of the public domain may make including that of the restriction of creativity and he then argues why the advocates arguments do not hold and why the act should be upheld, an act that protects Mickey Mouse.

In this article the author argues that the current system of digital media artist compensation by means of copyright protection is in the process of a "creative destruction" instigated by the internet and its users. "Creative destruction" is described as the process by which economic structures evolve via the destruction of old systems and the simultaneous rise of new ones. He points to the current "digital dilemma," the availability of mass copying and distribution of copyright protected digital media through the internet, as the catalyst for the "creative destruction of copyright and proposes several solutions. Some scholars have suggested a "pay-per-use" scheme to compensate artists for works distributed over the internet. Critics, however, insist that this scheme is not optimal since it would inhibit some fair uses of copyrighted works. The argument, in the author's opinion, boils down to a conflict between artist compensation and social welfare. He therefore proposes that in the face of the "digital dilemma" it is best to abolish the current copyright regime since there are currently drastic differences in the sources of revenue for artists and distributors of digital works and, while it is in society's interest to provide artists incentives to produce, it is also in the public's interest to reduce costs associated with distribution of digital works.

This article also discusses proponents of the copyright system that support expanding its reach throughout the internet and opponents who fear it because of potential limitations to fair use. It also delves into two cases regarding the internet and digital media copyright: the Napster and MP3.com cases. With respect to the fair use doctrine, it is clear that sharing of music over these networks did not constitute fair uses because it encroached on the market for digital music and deprived artists of potential revenues. The author continues to argue, however, that in the face of the internet, copyright has become irrelevant. The internet eliminates the free rider dilemma of digital music reproduction and distribution because users internalizes distribution costs by purchasing the hardware and software required to access the internet and the recording industry should collect royalties from the sales of these products. Digital media distribution via the internet the recording industry can also eliminate nearly all costs associated with distribution. An even more radical opinion considered is that there is no longer any need for copyright to protect the reproduction and distribution of digital media since there are drastic asymmetries in the revenue structures of artists and distributors. The article shows that artists derive very little revenue from the actual distribution of their works and that even if distribution revenues were eliminated, there could still be sufficient financial incentives for them to produce works.

I would like to use this as background evidence in my paper to show some sources of uncertainty in digital media copyright and potential new avenues that lawmakers and the courts could take. I would like to take into account the recent ways in which the recording industry has dealt with unlicensed online file sharing, namely by filing lawsuits and shutting down services providing free downloads or imposing licensing fees. I would also like to use the opinions regarding the current revenue structure of the music industry with respect to artists as support for the need to a new copyright system in the future.