Bridgeman Art Library, LTD v. Corel Corp. ended the argument that exact copies of any material are not copyrightable. For example, the Mona Lisa is a public domain work. However, collage artists found that when they wanted to get a reproduction of the Mona Lisa to use in their works, they still had to pay high licensing fees because the reproductions were copyrighted by the reproducers. The reproducers argued that because it takes great skill and effort to create a perfect reproduction of a painting. While the court admitted that although it is difficult to create a perfect reproduction of a work, the fact that the reproduction is exactly that - an exact reproduction - no artistic value added. Therefore the reproductions are not copyrightable.

This decision is important because it enabled collage artists to use public domain material in their works without having to make the reproductions themselves or getting a license from the museums or private collectors who were making reproductions of public domain works of art. Essentially, this court decision makes collage a potentially legal and viable art form. Without this case, collage artists would be basically without a means of accessing public domain works for use.

BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY, LTD. v. COREL CORP., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)

The case rises about when the Library sues Corel Corp, a company which makes photographic copies of famous artworks from museums, works which are already in public domain, sued Corel Corps for using digital images of these arts in their CD-Rom without compensation and sued the corporation for copyright infringement. The court was now faced with reinterpreting the loosely written “originality requirement” set during Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co v. Sarony in l884 and reshape the copyright clause of the constitution. Bridgeman points out in its argument the special techniques and extra effort and time which has put into reproducing the artworks as precisely and accurately as it can, but it further points to the fact while the copying of the artworks require a great deal of admirable skills, they are not of original merit and does not have artistic values that give them the right to copyright protection. Judge Kaplan puts it, “sweat of the brow” vs. “creative spark.” While the techniques and skills are valuable assets, they are not characteristics of creative of which, the case defines as “elements of originality… may include posing the subjects, lighting, angle, selection of film and camera, evoking the desired expression…” These “elements” described in the case are not to be developed through training and effort, the way techniques require to make a perfect copy of a painting would, but requires a natural talent to capture creative moment on the two dimensional space. Because the works under question adamantly lack “distinguishable variation” and original input from the actual work that is being reproduced, no copyright protection can be granted.

Ultimately, Bridgeman v. Corel Corp ruled that two dimensional photographic reproductions of art already in the public domain were not copyrightable because the reproduction process of the art involved zero originality, which does not merit them the copyright production enjoyed by original works of photography.

This case provides a great support to the case because the case directly recognizes the lack of structure of the Sarony case and faces the difficulty of its broad definition by placing more aesthetic requirements for copyright protection. The case pinpoints to the public that originality that come from art is a matter of talent, not in the skills and efforts put into it. But the word talent is a very subjective and elusive term, as its meaning changes with societal perception and preferences. To base a legal clause on an intangible term fails to create a concrete standard for the society. Also, words used such as “distinguishable variation” and “creative spark” to describe works of original art create clear boundaries that we come to expect from the law. Observing from previous cases, it is apparent that no clear precedent was formed from one case to another, but the court created new aesthetic definitions of “original work of art” through case-by-case studies. Aesthetic decisions have created inconsistency and lack of predictability in copyright law.